Abstract. We describe an ID based authenticated two pass key agreement protocol which makes use of the Weil pairing. The protocol is described and its properties are discussed including the ability to add key con rmation.
where ones identity becomes the public key and a key generation centre helps generate users private keys. The system of Cocks is based on the Quadratic Residuosity problem, whilst that of Boneh and Franklin relies on the Weil pairing.
In this paper we describe a two pass identity based authenticated key agreement protocol. Our protocol is based on the Weil pairing and combines the ideas of Boneh and Franklin with the tripartite Di e-Hellman protocol of Joux 6] . The message ows in our new protocol are identical with the message ows of the two pass elliptic curve based unauthenticated Di e-Hellman protocol, hence from the outside it looks like a Di e-Hellman or MQV protocol. But the way the session key is produced will make use of the Weil pairing and the identity based static public keys.
Our protocol being ID based requires a trusted key generation centre. The protocol has the novel property that the key generation centre is able to recover the agreed session keys from the message ows and its secret key. Combined with a secret sharing scheme for the key generation centres secret key, this allows for an e cient ID based escrow facility for sessions. This would enable law enforement agencies to decrypt messages encrypted with the session keys, after having obtained the necessary warrants. Note, that the ID based encryption scheme of Boneh and Franklin 1], also has the ability for the key generation centre to decrypt messages at will.
The Weil Pairing
In this section we shall summarize the properties we require of the Weil pairing, much of the details can be found in 1], 8] and 10]. We let G denote a prime order subgroup of an elliptic curve E over the eld F q . Let the order of G be denoted by l and de ne k to be the smallest integer such that ljq k ? 1: In practical implementations we will require k to be small and so we will usually take E to be a supersingular curve over F q .
The modi ed Weil pairing is a map e : G G ! F q k ; which satis es the following properties 1. Bilinear: ê(P 1 + P 2 ; Q) =ê(P 1 ; Q) ê(P 2 ; Q). ê(P; Q 1 + Q 2 ) =ê(P; Q 1 ) ê(P; Q 2 ). 2. Non-degenerate: There exists a P 2 G such thatê(P; P) 6 = 1. 3. Computable : One can computeê(P; Q) in polynomial time.
The non-degeneracy, as we have de ned it, does not hold for the standard Weil pairing e(P; Q), but it does hold for the modi ed Weil pairingê(P; Q). That the Weil pairing is e ciently computable follows from an unpublished, but much referenced, algorithm of Miller 9] . The modi ed Weil pairing that we use is de ned in 1] and it is computed in exactly the same way by using Miller's algorithm.
Originally the existence of the Weil pairing was thought to be a bad thing in cryptography. For example in 8] it was shown that the discrete logarithm problem in supersingular curves was reducible to that in a nite eld using the Weil pairing. This led supersingular elliptic curves to be dropped from cryptographic use. This situation changed with the work of Joux 6] , who gave a simple tripartite Di eHellman protocol based on the Weil pairing on supersingular curves. Since Joux's paper a number of other applications have arisen, including an identity based encryption scheme 1] and a signature algorithm 2]. The extension to higher genus curves has also recently been fully explored in 5].
The AK and AKC Protocols
Suppose we have a subgroup G of an elliptic curve for which the modi ed Weil pairingê maps into the nite eld F q k . We assume that q k is large enough to make solving discrete logarithms in the nite eld infeasible and we assume that the elliptic curve contains a large prime subgroup of order l, such that solving discrete logarithms in the subgroup of order l is also infeasible. Let V : F q k ?! f0; 1g denote a key derivation function. We shall not discuss the properties of this function in this paper, but simply note that such functions can be readily found in a number of standards documents. We let H : f0; 1g ?! G denote a cryptographic hash function. A simple de nition for H would be to apply a standard cryptographic hash function to obtain a seed X and then to compute X i = X + i for i = 0; 1; 2; : : : until a valid x-coordinate of a point was reached. The element in G is then de ned to be a point with this x-coordinate. The exact choice of y-coordinate also needs to be xed but this is easily done, for example in the case of characteristic greater than three one could select the value of the y-coordinate to be even.
3.1. System Setup. The key generation center chooses a secret key s 2 f1; : : : ; l ? 1g: The key generation centre produces a random P 2 G and computes P KGS = s]P:
Then the key generation centre publishes (P; P KGS ): When a user with identity ID wishes to obtain a public/private key pair, the public key is given by Q ID = H(ID):
The key generation centre computes the associated private key via S ID = s]Q ID :
Note, that this calculation can be performed using a distributed key generation centre using standard secret sharing methods. The secret key is then
We rst show that the secret shared keys agree, 3.3. E ciency. The above protocol is role symmetric, in that both parties execute the same operations. It is easy to see that the above protocol requires each party to perform two elliptic curve point multiplications and two evaluations of the Weil pairing. One should compare this with the MQV protocol 7], which is also role symmetric. The MQV protocol requires each party to perform two full elliptic curve point multiplications plus one \half" one. Since evaluating the Weil pairing is a more costly operation than a \half" of a point multiplication one can conclude that MQV is more e cient than the above protocol.
However, MQV requires a deployed PKI so as to authenticate the long term public keys, whilst our system uses an identity based system. Hence, depending on the application domain it may be that our protocol is more applicable.
We note that in both MQV and our protocol the message ows, of the AK protocol, consist of one elliptic curve point. Hence, the bandwidth required by the two protocols are the same.
Finally we note that the above e ciency arguments assume that a similar sized elliptic curve is used in both instances. Hence, this probably means that for our protocol a supersingular elliptic curve over a eld of characteristic three is to be pre erred.
3.4. Security. One can heuristically argue that the above protocol has the following security properties.
Known key security : Each run produces a di erent session key, and knowledge of past session keys does not allow deduction of future session keys.
Forward Secrecy : Compromising of a long term secret key, such as S A , at some point in the future does not lead to the compromise of communications in the past. Note, however that compromise of the key generation centres long term secret s will allow anyone to compute the key viâ e(Q B ; T A ) s ê(Q A ; T B ) s :
This implies that the key generation centre is able to determine all secret session keys. Key Control : Neither party can control the outcome of the session key, by for example restricting it to lie in some predetermined small set. The message authentication codes, M 1 and M 2 , are checked by both parties. On the assumption that both parties choose a di erent ephmeral key for each run of the protocol one can heuristically argue that we will obtain the desired key con rmation.
Conclusion
We have proposed an ID based authenticated key agreement scheme which uses the Weil pairing. In addition we have shown how to add key con rmation to the basic protocol.
